Decision in the Kremlin, 1956 -- the Malin Notes

Some Soviet documents relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution were handed over by President Yeltsin on his visit to Hungary in the Autumn of 1992. As a consequence, the chronology of events has become clearer and an insight into the kind of information the masters of the Kremlin had based their decisions has become possible.(1) However, one crucial link was still missing: no evidence was available on the discussions and debates in which the decisions were conceived.

The new documents providing an answer to at least the majority of these questions are quite unparallelled of their kind. In the1950s and 1960s, full minutes were not taken of the sessions of the CPSU Presidium. The head of the General Department of the Central Committee,Vladimir Nikiforovich Malin, however, was present at the discussions, and as a kind of aid to the formulation of decisions, he recorded who was present and made sketchy notes of what was being said. Through the efforts of Russian researchers, mainly of Vyacheslav Sereda, eighteen of these notes, including all those about discussions on the agenda concerning Hungary between 23 October and 4 November 1956, have been found in the Presidential Archives of the Russian Federation. They were published in Hungarian, in Russian and also in English.(2) The notes, in pencil and never actually used after the recording of the decisions, are fragmentary, making the work of the researcher something of puzzle solving. These rough notes nevertheless cast light on some major issues which were, up to now, pure guesswork for historians and laymen alike.

(General context) The events of spring 1956 in Eastern Europe thoroughly upset the policies of the Soviet Union vis a vis its satellites. Well before the 20th Party congress, there were marked signs that those policies were changing. From 1953 on, Stalin's successors were making efforts to "consolidate"or stabilize the internal political situation in those satellite countries which had been pushing forward too eagerly in building a Soviet-type society (mainly in the GDR and Hungary at the start); they were also trying to end the conflict with Yugoslavia. A policy of small steps and caution prevailed. They were weary of the inevitable disturbances and incalculable consequences that came in the wake of the changes.(3) From 1953 on, but even more following the 20th Congress, the Soviet leadership took great pains to promote the country's image. That attempt, alongside constant efforts to give evidence of peaceful intentions and tolerant, reasonable policies, was also manifest in the handling of the satellite countries. Moscow tried to avoid open and brutal intervention, made efforts to become "attractive", a kind of wise old patriarch whose authority came from the well deserved (and obligatory) respect due to the most experienced and much-suffered member of the family, one reason-able enough to learn from his own mistakes, rather than one taking a stick to children regularly.

In the spring of 1956 the Presidium of the Soviet Party was confronted with a dilemma. The question was, in fact, twofold: what to do about the East European freedom movements unfolding in various areas and in various ways, and in what manner to react if a reaction were needed. Should the new style in foreign policy continue, which was still just taking shape, or should there be a resort to the old means which, in fact, were entirely new, since after 1945 Stalin never had to dispatch the Red Army anywhere in a similar situation.

(The Polish paradigma)(4) In general it can be found that the Soviet foreign policy was twofold and hesitant, after an incalculable alarm-reaction the leadership preferred “mild” measures in the next phase of crises, nevertheless the possibility of “hard” intervention remained in all cases open. Being even “tolerant” they made clear signs of its limits. Soviet policy concerning the Polish crisis in October 1956 is a good demonstration of this behaviour -- as one can judge on by some new details having been provided by Malin-notes. So far we knew that during his unexpected visit in Warsaw October 19-20 Khrushchev blackmailed Gomulka threatening him by military measures, but since the latter protested heavily and convinced the Soviets that it was no intention from Polish behalf to get soviet armed forces pulled out and withdraw from Warsaw Pact, the Soviets retreated. Another reason of doing so was the information on spontaneous mass mobilization in Warsaw. Returning to Moscow the delegation reported the results to CPSU Presidium immediately. An inner, non-formal resolution was adopted then: “There’s only one way out: put an end to what is in Poland.”(5) Notes consist the outline of a scenario: troop moves camouflaged like maneuvres, mobilization of forces at home, organization of a counter-government called “committee”, information to satellite parties, preparation of appropriate documents, consultation with other party leaders, the Chinese among them. Action timing depended on Marshal Rokosowski’s case: “If Rokossowski is kept, we won’t have to press things for a while”.(6) The marshal was ousted from Polish CP Politburo by a large majority vote in the afternoon 20 October. The same note makes clear, however, that beyond military preparations the Presidium was considering some political concessions like calling KGB advisors back from Poland at the same time. The final conclusion was cautious: “Think through the questions that have been raised.”(7) A day later, on October 21, Presidium discussion on Poland was summed up by Khrushchev as follows: “Taking account of the circumstances we should refrain from military intervention. We need to display patience. (Everyone agrees with this.)”(8) Beyond the reasons mentioned above Soviet change of views and decisions can be explained by some factors later played crucial role in the Hungarian crisis as well: division and confusion had been created that unexpected events were bound to create within the Soviet leadership, disegreement with some allies, namely China, and fear of the possible Western reaction.

In the following I try to summarize main steps of Soviet decision-making on Hungary in chronological order:

1. Up to now, most information on the circumstances of the Russian intervention on October 23 was provided by Khrushchev's report of October 24. He had actually meant to invite the Hungarian First Secretary to Moscow when the latter told him over the telephone that "the situation in Budapest was serious, so he had rather not go to Moscow at this time. As soon as the conversation was over Comrade Zhukov informed Comrade Khrushchev that Gero had asked the military attache of the Soviet embassy in Budapest for the intervention of Soviet troops to halt demonstrations which were taking on unprecedented dimensions."(9) Thus, up to that point, according to Khrushchev, only two members of the Soviet leadership, he himself and the Minister of Defence, knew anything about the events in Budapest where, at that time, to their knowledge, only demonstrations were taking place. "The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party did not approve the intervention," Khrushchev added next day, "because no request has come from leading Hungarian functionaries."(10) In Malin's notes on the October 23 meeting, however, there is no trace of such a decision. If what Khrushchev says was true, then he must have discussed the issue only with a few members of the Presidium personally or over the telephone. "Shortly afterwards I received a phone call from the Soviet embassy in Budapest that the situation was highly dangerous, and the intervention of Soviet units was necessary."(11) By the testimony of the Malin notes, three leading functionaries, Zhukov, Bulganin and Khrushchev informed the Presidium on the situation in Budapest and in the whole of Hungary, then Khrushchev proposed the troops should have moved into Budapest without any reluctance. He wasted not a single word on any request by the "Hungarian comrades" nor was that mentioned in the decision (which, characteristically, was never, put into writing as a formal resolution).(12)

Anastas Mikoyan was regarded as the number one expert on Hungarian affairs by the others (he had been the most recent to visit the scene, and he had the best per-sonal knowledge of Hungarian leaders) He was the only one who attempted to put forward a proposal of his own. He suggested the "Polish scenario" with Moscow's assistance; he proposed the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the Hungarian leadership; by him political rather than military moves should be made, and a restoration of order by force should be left to the Hungarian leadership (i.e. to Nagy). He thought, probably on the basis of his experiences in Warsaw, that intervention could have far-reaching consequences; for instance, like Gomulka, some of the Hungarian party leadership might turn against the Soviet Union. The necessity for crushing the Budapest uprising was not doubted by him either but he hoped for a "cheaper" solution achieved by relying on the local forces, possibly on Imre Nagy.

Mikoyan's initiatives, however, failed: all the others supported the immediate sending in of troops. The final word was left to Khrushehev who, like Zhukov, did not completely reject Mikoyan's argument but "synthesized" it with his own proposal. So he gave his approval to Imre Nagy's involvement in the "political action", but for the time being not as Prime Minister. The entire meeting is unlikely to have lasted for more than half an hour, and when it was over (or perhaps while it was still in process), the Task Force stationed in Szekesfehervar received orders from Moscow to occupy Budapest.(13)

"The Presidium instructed Comrade Khrushchev to discuss this (i.e. military assistance) over the telephone with Comrade Gero" Khrushchev summed up the events of the previous day for the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak and East German party leaders on October 24. "This was done. Comrade Khrushchev let Comrade Gero know that their request would be fulfilled, provided that the Hungarian government put it in writing. Gero replied that he had no possibility to convene the government. Comrade Khrushchev then proposed that the request be submitted by Comrade Hegedus as the President of the Council of Ministers [Prime Minister]. Although this did not happen up to this day, the situation developed whereby Comrade Zhukov was given orders to occupy Budapest by the use of troops stationed on the territory of Hungary and in Uzhorod."(14) The First Secretary of the CPSU, wanting to take firm measures to prevent the loosening of the alliance but also to base relations within the camp on the "softer", post-1953 methods, chose to emphasise the elements of "mutuality" and "legitimate request for help", rather than describing what really happened at the meeting of the presidium. Maybe a day after Khruschev started to realize that they took a wrong and thoughtless decision and wanted to blame the Hungarian part, namely Gero.

2. For four days following 23 October, the most important Soviet decision-making body was practically "on the scene" via their emissaries who kept sending basically optimistic reports underestimating, sometimes belittling, the dimensions of the popular upheaval.(15) On 24 October, a top-level Chinese delegation led by Liu Shao-qi arrived in Moscow. Their negotiations focussed precisely on the "new type" of relations between the members of the camp - interestingly enough, mainly with regard to the Polish October.(16)

It was on October 28, with the formation of the Imre Nagy cabinet, a dramatic change in the assessment of the events in Budapest (what happened was not counter-revolution but a national democratic movement), the ceasefire and the demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, that the masters in the Kremlin were really confronted with the fact that the situation was more serious than they had believed. On October 28, the Presidium began discussing the Hungarian situation, and met every day right up to November 6. On October 28, the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC must have begun around midday, with reports from Budapest. Khrushchev stated, that “The matter is becoming more complicated. ... The workers are supporting the uprising (therefore they want to reclassify it as something other than "counter-revolutionary uprising").”(17) The introductory statement by Khrushchev already indicated that the mood had turned grim.

In the discussion the outlines of a "hardline" camp were beginning to emerge (Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Bulganin), one opposed to the halting of military operations and the inclusion of the withdrawal of troops (only from Budapest, for the time being) in the political declaration, still under preparation, of the Imre Nagy government. The hardliners did not necessarily reject any concessions but only within narrow limits. Voroshilov already raised the working out of „our own line" and making "a group of the Hungarians" join it. Bulganin went even farther than that by hinting at a point where we „will have appoint the gov’t directly".(18)

Since Voroshilov's criticism, however, was directed at least as much (if not more) at the Presidium members operating in Budapest, i.e. Mikoyan and Suslov, as at the Hungarians, it raised the spectre of a split within the Presidium. For after the "hardliners", the other side also went into action. Malenkov, Zhukov and Saburov rejected the criticism of their colleagues. They, too, urged the taking of certain measures (the creation of a suitable programme by the Hungarian government, the organisation of' militia) but they also insisted that, as Zhukov put it, "political flexibility" must be shown. The emerging "liberal" wing urged, for the time being, accommodation to the situation in Budapest, through the emissaries; whom it defended.

The more respected Presidium members present had all expressed their opinion. A deep anxiety settled on the meeting, partly because of the developments in Hungary, and partly because of the obvious but somewhat latent differences in principles and the fairly open personal differences. However, the particular and main cause lay in the "complicated situation"; a full assessment of the events was lacking, and so was an overview of the possibilities of action deriving from that assessment. By that time, the Presidium had received the draft declaration of the Nagy government, to be announced later that day; this included the request for the immediate withdrawal of troops from Budapest, and raised the possibility of future negotiations about a complete withdrawal from Hungary. As it is well established, the declaration meant a radical turn in the judgement taken of the revolution. Thus, someone had to speak up, and Khrushchev took the responsibility.

3. Khrushchev must have thought that even worse than a split was the fact that, quite obviously, no one had any idea about what to do when the momentary situation was changing, and no one had a sufficient vision of the alternatives for action. That raised the danger of incapacity for action and/or precipitousness. His thoughts may have gone somewhat farther forward than those of the others: if Nagy and the Hungarian leadership had already been brave enough to disregard the Soviet instructions (for instance, on October 26, they let Mikoyan and Suslov know that negotiations should be started with the rebels, the students and the intellectuals, that politicians from other parties should be included in the government)(19) then, should Moscow support the declaration including a radical change, they might go even further. Khrushchev, unlike the others, openly expressed the dilemma that was on everyone's mind on the 28 October meeting: “Will we have a government that is with us or will there be a gov’t that is not with us, and will request the withdrawal of troops. What then?”(20)

Khrushchev, for the first time since the outbreak of the crisis formulated alternatives: an optimum one for the Soviet leadership (that the Hungarian government would take action and crush the revolt) and another one drawn up on the basis of the principle of the "highest probability" (“Nagy will turn against us. He will demand a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops, followed by capitulation”). Finally, for this latter case, he sketched out the basics of a set of guidelines, of a "scenario". It would, however, be an exaggeration to say that all this was set out by Khrushchev in such a "strict" logical sequence for the Presidium.

The basics of the "scenario" may be reconstructed as follows: first, the establishment of a new political centre which he spontaneously called a "committee". Second, the drawing up of suitable "documents" (the political "platform" of the committee, the appeal of the Soviets to the Hungarians), and finally, a showdown with the rebels by the Soviet forces. Most of Khrushchev's "variants" were thus not real alternatives but possible elements of a programme for action. But he seemed to recoil after spelling out the first point ("this is the worst alternatve" i.e. establishing a counter-government), and in the second, he repeated, quickly and illogically, the consensus reached thus far as an alternative: "this gov’t is retained".(21)

Khrushchev finally formulated a few resolutions. A four-member group (Brezhnev, Pospielov, Furtseva and Shepilov) would be given the job of working the "documents" to be issued by the Soviets. Another resolution concerned the involvement of the "fraternal parties" (they were to be asked to appeal to the Hungarians). After that, all that had to be done was to set up the "committee".

4. Yet, Khrushchev ended his speech by asking the Presidium to support the moves of Imre Nagy. After having detailed the alternatives and going as far as to the final, worst option, the First Secretary actually joined the still undecided "liberals"! He had done his job, he had drawn up the "scenario" for a solution of the crisis. He must have thought that now he could give his own view, but he may also have been led by tactical, "technocratic" considerations: in the possession of more or less clear alternatives, the debate would gain new momentum, the divisions within the Presidium would become more evident and, of course, he obviously hoped that his proposal would be accepted.

A long debate ensued, in the early stages of which the balance appeared to be tipping toward Khrushchev's last proposal. It seemed as if everyone were weary of a situation in which the implementation of Khrushchev's "scenario" might become necessary, the consequences of which were hard to calculate. As Bulganin said: "Otherwise we’ll have to undertake an occupation. This will drag us into a dubious venture."(22) Kaganovich put this in even clearer terms: "If we do not offer support [to the government], there’ll be an occupation of the country. That will take us far afield."(23) Khrushchev even brought a new argument into the discussion: "The English and French are in a real mess in Egypt. We shouldn’t get caught in the same company."(24) Since the actions of the British and French in Egypt were later to be characterized as "agression", and "military adventure" by the Soviets, refraining from acting likewise may even appear as a matter of principle or of ideology. However, it is much more likely that Khrushchev was hinting at the severe difficulties facing the British and the French following military action.

In the meantime, Suslov arrived from Budapest, and made his verbal report: First he analysed the military situation, then the scale of the popular movements, then he turned to their own efforts aimed, after October 26, at creating a "relatively stable" government consisting not only of communists. He dealt with the political debate of the HWP PC that morning on changing the assessment of the popular movement(25) (laying special emphasis on Kadar's role) and on the ceasefire (which had been sup-ported also by the representatives of the Soviet Party Presidium). Finally, Suslov spoke of Imre Nagy, pointing out that the "thesis" on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary had been "inserted" in the government declaration by Imre Nagy personally.(26) The "message" of Suslov's report was clear: the Hungarian situation had turned dangerous and incalculable.(27)

5. During its debate on October 28, the events of the next three days, the period leading up to the decision, had been practically "played out" in advance by the Presidium. Almost all the pros and cons had been discussed, most arguments had been raised. The two camps -- the active group of the hardliners (Molotov, Voroshilov, and Suslov in Budapest), opposed by the much less self-assured "liberals" (Mikoyan in Budapest, and in Moscow, somewhat waveringly, Zhukov) -- had taken definite shape. Between them, there were the determined yet sometimes selfcontradicting statements of the "senior" members of the Presidium, of whom Bulganin and Kaganovich rather favoured the hardliners, while Malenkov was a shade closer to the "liberals". The others hardly made a move; with the exception of Saburov who, in the October 28 debate, came out definitely on the side of the "lib-erals". The position of the "lowlands", obviously hinged on the direction the real decision-makers were moving in, on the ultimate balance between them. All that depended mainly on the man who was Number One. It was precisely Khrushchev's attitude up to then that had been least consistent. His proposals made on October 28 placed him closer to the "liberals", yet he had been the first to suggest military intervention on the 23rd. He rose above his fellows not only by the strength of his formal position: he was also the man with the best grasp of the full complexity of the situation and most able to place all Moscow's potential interests in the balance at the same time. An awareness of all that, as well as of his key role, must have weighed heavily on him. He knew that a decision had to be made. It was Khrushchev alone who, at the beginning of his longest speech, made reference to the responsibility of the Soviet leadership, and tried to create some kind of harmony between the brutal logic of power and the principles professed by all of them, formally at least. He must have sensed that his word would be crucial when the final decision was made, and he wanted to avoid making the wrong decision -- wrong from the point of view of the Empire, that is. And at that time, he was not able to come to a decision.

Following the long meeting of the 28th, the most important of the Soviet leaders attended two receptions on the 29th. One was in celebration of the Turkish national day, the other on the occasion of the visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. At the frst, Ambassador Bohlen of the United States had an important conversation with Marshal Zhukov; Bohlen once again called attention to Secretary of State Dulles's speech delivered two days earlier in Dallas. Dulles had said that the American administration would not consider a Hungary liberated from Soviet rule as a potential ally. In accordance with the deadlock reached at dawn of that day, Zhukov could not say anything final, only that the troops would leave Budapest.(28) Bohlen's reports are not clear as to whether the Soviet leaders were "anxious" or actually they appeared to be in “considerably better spirits" than before. On the other hand, he drew an interesting and partly correct conclusion from his conversation with Zhukov: "... from the general tenor of his [Zhukov's] remarks, as well as statements to press by Shepilov and him, it looks as though Soviet decision was to support the Nagy government to end, although possibly primarily in Budapest leaving provinces and other towns for subsequent moping up if resistance can be broken in capital, thereby hoping to avoid total military occupation of Hungary by Soviet forces."(29)

6. By October 30, the Soviet leadership was confronted with the international response to the Hungarian events, the latest developments in Budapest and another international crisis, following the Suez invasion, all at the same time. Although in the debate of October 30, not a word was said either about the American position or about Suez, they must have been on everyone's mind.

The morning began with another round of negotiations with the Chinese delegation carried on this time by Khrushchev alone. In the meantime, the other members of the Presidium began their meeting, listening to reports, including that day's report by Mikoyan and Suslov on the deterioration of the Budapest situation and the potential threat of the Hungarian army going over to the rebels.(30) That report was, in essence, a call for military intervention, and was corroborated by another from military sources (this was summed up by Zhukov). It may be presumed (the notes are fragmentary) that transport planes landing at Vienna carrying aid had been identified by military intelligence as signs of preparation for an outside military intervention. Under the influence of that report, those attending the meeting immediately decided, in accordance with Mikoyan and Suslov's proposal, to send Marshal Koniev to Budapest.

Khrushchev, who had been negotiating with the Chinese alone until then, arrived in the conference room after that. By that time the decision-making process, beginning to get under way, almost according to the "scenario" of October 28, was halted again. The turn around was due to a new declaration made by the Chinese (which may have been formulated jointly with Khrushchev). "We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people's democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based."(31) - Khrushchev declared. The Chinese also suggested that "relations with the countries of the socialist camp be built on the principles of Pancha Sila."(32)

Up to then, the Chinese position had been fairly consistent. Liu-Shao-qi's first statements on 24 October had already made it clear that the Chinese did not unconditionally recognize the leading role of the Soviet Union, and wanted to take advantage of the Soviets being under pressure from several sides to make them accept the Chinese interpretation of that leading role. China undoubtedly favoured greater equality within the socialist camp, where the Soviet Union would be "first among equals", or rather "between two equals", a position in which the "second equal" might, in time, become a true equalor even a first. The hesitation of Khrushchev, worrying about the Soviet image, benefited them. It gave greater weight and a wider validity to their criticism of mutual relations. The leaders of China did not agree with several features of de-Stalinization but as far as mutual relations were concerned, they were certainly happier without Stalin. Khrushchev must have informed Liu Shao-qi of the results of the debate of October 28. On his side, he must have been worried that a brutal intervention in Hungary would give momentum to the hardliners, a power struggle could restart, resulting in a return to Stalinist methods in other political areas. He was the one who had committed himself most at the 20th Congress, thus he would be the first to be swept away by re-Stalinization.The first turnaround of the debate on the 30th must have been due to the convergence of the interests of Khrushchev and the Chinese.

The "hardliners" had become confused, it was Molotov who tried to evaluate the current situtation in a most concentrated way. Realizing that it was the whole empire complex at stake he tried to show some indulgence (“Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.”(33)). General concept of Chinese and Khrushchev was disputed by him, however (“Relations along interstate lines are on one basis, and interparty relations on another”(34)). The "liberals" seemed to go on an offense not just in general but also with regard to settling the Hungarian situation. Minister of foreign affairs Shepilov claimed the complete revision of soviet foreign policy concerning the satellites: “The course of events reveals the crisis in our relations with the countries of people's democracy. ... The underlying reasons must be revealed. ... Eliminate the elements of diktat.”(35) In case of a Hungarian request troops were to been withdrawn because “we support the principles of non-interference” -- Shepilov said, adding, that “We’ll have to keep up a struggle with national communism for a long time”.(36) Zhukov took the same position: “We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole. This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.” As for the forces stationing in the GDR and Poland he made a definite difference, “it must be considered at the Consultative Council [of the Warsaw Pact]”.(37) Saburov agreed with the proposal on pull out troops and made the sharpest self-criticism of all Presidium sessions known: “ At the XX Congress we did the correct thing but then did not keep control of the unleashed initiative of the masses. ... We failed to stand for genuine Leninist principles of leadership. ... Relations must be built on an equal basis.”(38) Soon after those shocking words Khrushchev came to the conclusion that the Presidium made a decision unanimously to issue a general political declaration both on relationships within the camp and on the situation of Hungary.

7. The October 30 statement of the Soviet government may be regarded as a temporary victory indeed, the last up to the mid-eighties of the "liberal" view in the international area, the kind of thinking which dared to mention the withdrawal of troops.(39) Even though the actual decision ultimately went the other way, that statement, when it was created, was by no means a cynical maneuver meant to mislead, but a genuine mirror of the debates and power struggles going on within the Soviet leadership, one of the rare moments when the Empire sent signals to the outside world that it might be opening up. The initiator, Khrushchev, must have still believed in the usefulness of the October Polish formula, if in very different circumstances.

The plan of military withdrawal was motivated by variety of factors. One of the principal motives was to lessen the risk of conflict, uncertainty and anxiety. The clearest reference to this was made by Zhukov: "To persist further -- it is unclear what will come of this."(40). As a military commander, he may have felt intimations of a series of armed uprisings in several countries, and of a conflict with the West including the threat of a world war. Another motive was also referred to several times, retaining the image developed of the Soviet Union after 1953, and even more after the 20th Congress. The West must accept Stalin's conquests though there was no Stalin and his methods were not to be used. Since 1955, at least in certain areas, even the withdrawal of troops was a feasible option (Finland, Austria). A third motive was the "self-critical tendency" in some of the Soviet leadership, and especially in Khrushchev, under the influence of the 20thCongress. Stalin's "exposure" at the Congress, planted a sense of doubt and ambivalence in some of them. These doubts were intensified by each dramatic climax (like the Hungarian Revolution) that came as a consequence of de-Stalinization. The process went as far as the actual realization that retaining the system required that it be changed; at least to a limited degree. The "military and political lesson" mentioned by Zhukov lay precisely in the manner in which this idea incoherent as it still was, was to be put into practice in resolving the Hungarian problem, then turned into a set of bilateral rules and normatives in everyday relations.

In the case of Hungary, the "liberal" alternative rested on the assumption that even after the departure of Soviet troops, Hungary would remain a member of the Warsaw Pact, and the communists would continue to play a dominant (or hegemonic) role in political life. Thus the "liberals" had no intention of giving up the two fundamental priorities of Soviet policy: maintaining the unity of the Empire, and the communist system. Shepilov laid great emphasis on this when he said: "The foundations remain unshakable". In other words, if "the foundations" came to be threatened, then this solution would no longer apply. It is clear from another of Shepilov's sentences that in the mind of the "liberals" the danger lay in "national communism", that is, in a greater independence and autonomy of the local communist parties remaining in power. Summing up, the "national communist" alternative would have assured far greater independence to Hungary than the rule of Rakosi or Gero. At the same time, however, it would have produced a hotbed of conflicts with the Soviets. Thus the "liberals" were also far from unequivocal in accepting the main objectives of the Hungarian revolution.

8. The weakness of the "liberal" alternative lay in the relative weightlessness of its representatives. The most prestigious, Zhukov, was not only a political leader but the representative of offcers of field rank in the Presidium and the army -- although presumably there were disagreements among the generals, too -- was basically pro-intervention. Saburov and Shepilov were not among the most prestigious members of the Presidium, which meant that the position of the "liberals" depended on Khrushchev. And Khrushchev himself embodied the "liberal" ambivalence described above more than anyone else.

For the moment, he was waiting. The discussion of the text of the statement was suspended twice because Khrushchev spoke directly with Mikoyan (Khrushchev did not report any special deterioration), then the ambassador of the Soviet Union to Beijing made his appearance, bringing a message from the Chinese delegation still in Moscow. This consisted of questions only ("What’s the situation? Will Hungary leave our camp? Who is Nagy? Can he be trusted?"(41)) However, it was an indirect warning that the far reaching measures planned were viewed doubtfully by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese position, or at least this warning, confirmed the earlier assumption of the "hard line" that, although the Chinese urged the "five principles"' in general, they had no intention of applying them to the current situation in Hungary. Only Khrushchev had argued in favour. Nevertheless the final text of the Soviet government statement clearly shows that the actual decision was not taken under the influence of the Chinese message. It indicates that the "liberals" gained the upper hand, and also points out the limits of their victory: "Keeping in mind that the continued stationing of Soviet military units in Hungary may serve as a pretext for a further deterioration of the situation, the Soviet government has instructed its military command to withdraw Soviet military units from Budapest as soon as this was considered feasible by the Hungarian government. At the same time, the Soviet government is ready to start negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and with the governments of other countries taking part in the Warsaw agreement on the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary."(42)

Subsequently, the entire Presidium again sat down at the negotiating table with the Chinese. Liu Shao-qi reported directly the opinion of the Beijing leadership: "... the troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest."(43) Khrushchev and Molotov, representing the Soviets, responded to Liu's words with the newly carried resolution and they both declared that the Soviet Union would begin negotiations on the withdrawal of troops -- which, in the given case, involved Hungary. They made it clear that there had been a disagreement, however. The October 30 statement remained in force even though the Chinese view had become known. That possibility stayed alive for a whole night...

9. In October 31, on the next session of the Presidium the negotiations with the Polish leadership were on agenda when Khrushchev stated in an apparently sudden way: “We should reexamine our assessment and should not withdraw our troops from Hungary and Budapest. We should take the initiative in restoring the order in Hungary.”(44) The “scenario” of October 28 was introduced with a dramatic change.

What had changed overnight? In his memoirs Khrushchev refers to a lonely, sleepless night spent before the decision was changed.(45) But even if he had spent the night alone and sleeplessly, Khrushchev may have met some of his fellow leaders before the session. As far as the hawks were concerned, there can be little doubt as to the direction in which they tried to inf luence Khrushchev, if he appeared to have lost his assurance.

Krushchev's arguments in f act seem to indicate that nothing had changed compared to the day before -- nothing, that is, except his own opinion. For instance, there is no sign of any information (such as, news of the bloody assault on the Party headquarters in Budapest's Koztarsasag ter) having reached the Presidium. There is no sign of an impact of the American position. No sign of later Chinese views or advice. There was no mention of the latest developments in the Suez crisis, of the engagement of British and French troops. No new military report was given by Zhukov. Serov, the KGB head still in Budapest, had not reported either.

This, of course, does not mean that Khrushchev or others did not review all that had been reported from Budapest for the past few days. (For instance, the formation of a multi-party coalition government.) Nor does it mean that they did not consider the possible interpretations of Dulles's speech in Dallas on October 27 or that they did not spend time pondering Liu Shao-qui views of the day before. No doubt he thought over the consequences of the Suez war: a conflict between the United States and its European allies. What is certain is that the notes contain nothing on all this, There was no mention of further information from Budapest, no sign of an impact of the American position or of later Chinese views or advice in Krushchev's arguments. He referred only to the weakness of the Hungarian government ("...we should say we tried to meet them halfway, but there is not now any government"(46)) which meant in Moscow’s eyes the weakness of Hungarian communists and was a clear point to the formation of a multi-party coalition government the day before.

There was a single thing that Khrushchev spoke about at length and repetitiously that was protecting the prestige of the empire. A military pullout from Hungary would give evidence to the weakness of the Soviet Union, and the Western powers would take advantage of that. “If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French -- the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive. ... To Egypt they will then add Hungary.”(47) Interestingly enough Khrushchev considered the Suez case being decided already at this moment. He also emphasized the domestic political effects of a grave loss of prestige. "[By withdrawing] we would then be exposing the weakness of our positions. Our Party will not accept if we do this."(48) The reference was much rather to the "circles" capable of influencing the leadership than to the grass roots party members, mainly to the army, to state security and the apparatus. What turned out to be fundamentally important was the protection of the Soviet Union's position as a world power and the retaining of the unity of the leadership. Apparently, none of the other issues influencing the decision (ideology, the maintainance of the image, pure military and strategic considerations) had sufficient weight in Khrushchev's thinking to justify a hard-line decision.

When Khrushchev's general arguments had been laid out, a kind of vote was followed, unlike as in the days before. All the members of the presidium present (in addition to Khrushchev, these were Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Saburov, and a candidate member, Zhukov) were in agreement, including Saburov and Zhukov, the leading "liberals".

Khrushchev seemed uncertain about who the head of the "provisional revolutionary government" to be established should be. He mentioned Kadar first, then: ("Best of all --[he will be] a deputy") he seemed to wish to put most of the executive power (prime ministership, ministry of interior and defense) in the hands of Munnich. That explains why the Soviets were waiting five days before going into action (naturally the military preparations also needed some time). He hadn’t decided yet what to do with Nagy. His enigmatic sentence ("This government -- we should invite them, say, to negotiations about the withdrawal of troops, and resolve the matter"(49)) indicates perhaps that troop withdrawal negotiations could be used as a tool of deception, a pretext for arresting the members of the government. That was exactly what happened on November 4, 1956, if not to the entire government, but to the Minister of Defense Pal Maleter, the Minister of State Ferenc Erdei and General Istvan Kovacs, the chief of staff . Khrushchev intended to give some kind of a role to Nagy in the process of normalization, assuming that he was willing to resign and "approve" the Soviet intervention. Here, the scenario, however, was failed by Imre Nagy himself.

A single man still harboured doubts. Deputy Prime Minister Saburov made a last attempt to argue the "liberal" line, in what seems to be one of the most enigmatic sentences of the Malin Notes: ("After yesterday’ session, this discussion is all pointless.") In his own way, he was using the same kind of arguments as Khrushchev when he warned against halting the policy of detente ([Our move] will vindicate NATO”(50)), but received no support from anyone. According to Malin, Voroshilov, Bulganin and Zhukov all said the same thing, namely that "We should reject the view that we are reexamining our position.(51) It is possible, for instance that, referring to the previous day, Zhukov meant that the principles of the government, declaration of October 30 would largely remain valid. Unfortunately, this is precisely where the notes become most "condensed". At any rate, what is clear is that by the end of the meeting, no one argued with Khrushchev any longer.

After finalising the resolutions on the main topic and the international coordination of Soviet steps the only thing left open was the persons of participants from Hungarian side. Former Hungarian party leaders in Moscow (maybe they stayed in the Kremlin building), Rakosi, Hegedus and Gero unanimously named Ferenc Munnich as their choice -- which may have been the very thing that gave Khrushchev second thoughts.

10. Khrushchev was not in Moscow on the 1st, 2nd and for part of the 3rd of November. He spent those days informing the allies and Tito. The presidium remained in session in his absence, continuing to perform the tasks set out in the resolution of 31 October, and they had to convince the key actors involved by, but not taking part in the making of, the decisions.

Anastas Mikoyan had returned from Budapest on October 31. As he learned of the rejection of the "liberal" alternative from Khrushchev himself, he threatened suicide, no less.(52) Although he was clearly told that the decision was final, on November l, Mikoyan did make an attempt at the Presidium meeting to change it. He spoke in favour of the "dilluted liberal alternative": preventing intervention, allowing a respite of least 15 days to the Nagy government, to stabilise the situation in, and to decide on the use of force only then. Accordingly, it was sensed even by Mikoyan and the "liberals" that the Budapest government might move in a dangerous direction (in Moscow's eyes, that is); he, too, drew the general political limit: "We simply cannot allow Hungary to be removed from our camp"(53). He also made reference to where the pressure for supporting the hard line was coming from: "We should not quarrel right now with the army."(54) All in all, the view of the crisis of the "liberal" camp and its proposal for a solution also rested on pragmatic considerations similar to those furnishing the basis, for the resolution of October 31. His initiative was not supported on one hand; on the other he also agreed with the others in preserving political unity of the camp. So the only dissenter had been convinced by the "debate".

Next task was to find the key actors for carrying out the "political measures" needed, and to provide them with their instructions. Next day, on November 2, Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich arrived in Moscow. On the previous day, through Munnich, Kadar had been invited for talks by Andropov, the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest; he did not inform Imre Nagy or other members of the government of this.

Kadar’s long and detailed speech on a meeting with several members of the Presidium noted by Malin(55) suggests that even if he had an inkling about why he had been "required" in Moscow, he knew nothing for certain at the time. He was probably asked to describe the situation, to explain his view. A born politician, but also confused enough partly he analysed the situation from an "outsider's" point of view, partly tried to explain his own moves, cast light on the motives behind them, as if he were giving some kind of action report to vindicate himself. In general he spoke as a genuine member of the Nagy government, accepting the responsibility for their common decisions. He touched upon the possible "solutions", sketched out the perspectives, taking a quite distinct position, too, but also making it apparent that he could imagine both solutions. Meantime he must have watched every move, every reaction to what he was saying, trying all the time to make out if the leaders of the CPSU had already come to a decision, and if so, what the decision was. However, his "hosts" remained silent; he was being scrutinised.

The disjointed character of his narrative must have been due to his anxiety, to the complex, state of mind he was in. He had evidently meant to relate events in chronological order but halted time and again, sometimes to offer a political analysis, sometimes to add his own impressions as an illustration, and f inally, to explain what had been done --and especially why -- in the given situation by himself or the government. Another reason for the disjointedness may have been that he was being bombarded with questions, unrecorded by Malin, by the Soviets. An "interrogation" of this kind, however, is not really probable. The "leaps" in the notes were most likely due to the circumstance, unusual for Malin, that what Kadar, who could not speak Russian, said was coming through an interpreter.

The way Kadar spoke clearly suggests that he was making a genuine effort to provide a differentiated picture to the Soviets. He was probably aware of what mattered to them most: the behaviour of the power centre, the government, the party leadership, commanders of the army. He spoke about these at length, at the same time pointing at the mass nature of the movement, which was not aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic order. In analysing the popular movement, Kadar gravely criticised the Gero leadership as well as the Soviet Union blaming the armed intervention, for the very different dimensions taken by the popular movement.

His pessimistic view of the future of the coalition government reflected first of all his personal impressions on the complete disintegration of the HWP and its cadres. He was wary mainly of the pressure from the right outside the government. He had a similar "gut" mistrust of the military leaders the revolution had placed in key positions, the effect of which was probably not lost on a Presidium, always sensitive to that issue. Kadar gave a detailed and largely truthful report of the November 1 resolutions of the government the decision to quit the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality. He also gave voice to, perhaps even overemphasized, his misgivings about those decisions. Nevertheless, when talking about the "future", he started out from them: "Yesterday I voted for these two decisions of the government.”(56) Concerning the alternative solutions, he mainly stressed the difficulties, and refrained from one-sidedly committing himself to either the military or the political option. The notes unambiguously indicate that he was far more worried about the impact of military intervention than about the political struggles facing the communists in the event of a Soviet troop pullout. In the latter case, he thought that even with all the difficulties and uncertainties, the chances were good enough. In the event of military intervention, on the other hand, he saw no way out, and tried rather to warn of the dangers of such a decision. He had no doubts about the ability of the armed force to destroy the uprising, but "... what will happen then? The morale position of the Communists will be reduced to zero."(57)

The other two Hungarians present spoke much less, which makes evident the leading role of Kadar, also in Moscow's eyes. Munnich's contribution also contained criticism but only concerning Rakosi and his group, it was they whom he blamed, among other things, for the anti-Soviet mood in the country. He warned against the withdrawal of troops, drawing the conclusion that "There can be little trust that it will be possible to cope with events politically."(58) Istvan Bata, the last one to speak, was outspoken in his support for military intervention but was also uninformed about the intentions of the Soviets, suggesting, as he did, the imposing of a "military dictatorship".

11. The unedited version of Khrushchev's memoirs includes a part omitted from earlier editions: a description of Kadar's "wavering" on his first days in Moscow, of which the First Secretary learned from Molotov. According to Khrushchev, he had a personal discussion with Kadar on his arrival, who said afterward that he agreed with the decisions of the Presidium of the CPSU.(59) According to the sources, both were present at the November 3 meeting of the Presidium. In addition to Malin’s notes a Hungarian note has been remained which put down Khrushchev’s words lacking in Russian version.(60) It clearly shows the way in which he wanted to influence the “reluctant” Kadar. Above all, the First Secretary was self-critical: he admitted earlier mistakes of the Soviet leadership in the field of cadre policy, primarily the delay in the removal of Rakosi, then replacing him by Gero. Thus, these notes show not even a trace of what had spread as a legend for decades: that Kadar was effectively blackmailed by Khrushchev into accepting the leading role by the threat that the old leadership would return if he refused. Quite to the contrary, Khrushchev gave a concession making clear that Rakosi had been "dropped" for good by Moscow. Regarding the case of Nagy, however, he left a door open: although he declared that the Prime Minister could not be regarded as a communist, he also said that Nagy would be considered to be "in the service of the enemy" only if he refused to resign.

Kadar's answer indicates that he would have preferred to speak in greater detail on the mistakes in Soviet policy and the crimes of the Rakosi clique. However, he was not given time for this. At the moment he refrained from getting so far in judgement of Nagy like Khrushchev did; he stated only that “It looks as if the Nagy government were covering up for the massacre of communists but this is mere appearance.”(61) Finally, after a longer introduction, he declared he agreed with the Soviet position. “What must be done? Surrendering a socialist country to counter-revolution is impossible. I agree with you. The correct course of actions is to form a revolutionary government.”(62) It is obviously the same argument Khrushchev used on 31 October.

Kadar gave a concession and was given one at the same time. Since he was a "partner" again he as such could have conditions of his own. That was why just after his quasi-installation into power he spoke about things he was hardly ever to mention again for nearly thirty years to come, things he would nevertheless carry in the depths of his consciousness, and which would influence his decisions. One of these was the painful memory of the mass character of the popular uprising ("the whole nation is taking part in the movement.") but also the unwillingness to accept a blank collective punishment for the whole people, the rejection of mass terror with its incalculable results ("The nation does not want to liquidate the people's democratic order”).(63) Another thing was his limited sympathy with hurt national sentiments. Also, an understanding of imperial-type dependence on the Soviet Union clashed in him with the impossibility of dealing with it psychologically: it was the leadership of the empire that would elevate him to power, without them, he would be nothing he would have no authority: on the other hand, it was a source of life-long humiliation that all this was possible through them only, let alone the manner in which all this was happening. At that point, Kadar still said the withdrawal of Soviet troops was important, wanted to think over the whole system of relations, and actually went as far as to declare: "This government must not be puppetlike”(64), thus passing sentence not only on his predecessors but also on the very manner in which he himself had been handpicked.

Afterward, when Ferenc Munnich had declared his agreement, Kadar repeated the point like a good pupil: “The position: on the basis of defending the people's democratic order, socialist gains, and friendship with the USSR and with other socialist countries and cooperation with all peaceloving countries."(65) But he took advantage of even this occasion to make a point. Until then, the Soviet leadership had wasted few words on the multi-party system in Hungary--Kadar had spoken about it at greater length a day earlier. According to Horvath’s notes, at the November 3 meeting, agreement was reached even on the members of the government, who did not include anybody from the other parties. At that time,however, Kadar still counted on some fellow-travellers and eventually even on Imre Nagy. That was why he remarked: "If we declare Nagy’s government counter-revolutionary, all parties will fall under this rubric.”(66)

The new government of Hungary was established with the resolution of the"Presidium of the CPSU CC passed later that evening. The head of the other government, the existing one, Imre Nagy was at that time getting ready for a meeting with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Rumania, a meeting about which the participants of the session in Moscow were precisely informed.(67) In Moscow, in the meantime, the finishing touches were being added to the text of the manifesto of the Kadar government. The members of the "escort" -- Malenkov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev -- were appointed. The time of the departure was set for 7 or 8 o'clock on the morning of November 4, (Hungarian time is two hours behind Moscow.). The military onslaught on Budapest and the country would start even earlier, at 4:15 p. m.

(Conclusions) Malin's notes give an insight into the inner workings of the Kremlin machinery, the thinking and reasoning of its leaders. The Presidium of the CPSU CC seems a world of its own, the actors of which are moved by a few very simple considerations and take a limited number of factors into account when making their decision. Discussions appear to have been quite unsophisticated, as if variants of the same half a dozen arguments were being repeated by everyone, sometimes contrary ones by the same person. The Hungarian crisis confronted them with a complex of dilemmas, of which they expressed only one or two.

In the Soviet view, the Hungarian revolution was not a popular movement. Its multiplicity of aims struck no special chord in the Kremlin, and it was not them asses that created fear and uncertainty but the character, composition and actions of the government likely to come to power as a result. Within this, the aspect weighing heaviest was how the leaders in Budapest viewed the Soviet military-political alliance. What was happening in Hungary was judged ultimately on the basis of the behaviour and statements of a few individuals, of party, government, military and state security leaders.

There was a common opinion earlier that the use of force was basically inherent in Kremlin policy, and would have inevitably ensued in case certain bounds were overstepped (as happened in Hungary, but not in Poland). However, the conclusion--and this seems indeed, to be borne out by the notes--that the possibilities were more open, the Soviet leadership more divided, and some of its members, especially Khrushchev, more "of two minds" than many had believed. The Hungarian revolution as a "phenomenon” involved above all, a new challenge, a situation for which there were no ready-made scenarios, these had to be invented while things were actually going on. After Stalin, the Soviet system allowed the formation of groups within its leadership, that, in turn, induced disputes. The premises on which a decision was based became more variegated, could be openly stated, and even argued for. De-Stalinisation generated doubt and uncertainty in the leadership, and a revisionist tendency, which affected foreign policy too. Not only the usual assumptions were applied to Hungary but also that Hungarian events were shaping the presumptions of the Soviets. A "liberal" camp was, even if tentatively, being formed, which, even though it did not accept the demands of the Hungarian revolution, tried to treat the individual countries in the bloc as relatively autonomous. That camp suffered a heavy defeat on October 31, 1956. It was not wiped out: it gained new momentum in domestic politics in June l957, when the attempted coup against Khrushchev was put down and then again in 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. But those proved to be only temporary changes. What did not change was the Soviet method of crisis management: intervention and the application of pressure were in evidence in analogous situations time and time again, 1968, in 1979 and then, in 1981. From that point of view, the year 1956 and Hungary represented a watershed. For a moment it actually seemed as if there really were a chance that, in the flash of light cast by the Hungarian revolution, a near-miraculous impulse for soul-searching might drive the carriage of the empire off the tracks on which it continued to move even while the vehicle itself was undergoing several repairs. That chance, however, passed, and for good. After several crises, all of which were solved basically according to the "Hungarian" recipe fundamental change was brought only by the ultimate, crisis at the end of the 1980s.

Original Hungarian version in: Dontes a Kremlben 1956 - A szovjet partelnokség vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest, 1956-os Intezet), 111-154.

Original English version: The Road to Budapest, 1956. New Documentation on the Kremlin’s Decision to Intervene. The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. 36, 37 (1996) 24-41, 16-31, respectively.

(1) See A Jelcin dosszie - Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-rol (The Yeltsin File. Soviet Documents on 1956) Ed. by Eva Gal, Andras B. Hegedus,Gyorgy Litvan, Janos M. Rainer. Budapest, Szazadveg - 1956-os Intezet, 1993; Hianyzo lapok 1956 tortenetebõl. Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KB Levaltarabol (Missing Pages from the History of1956. Documents from the Archives of the Central Committee of the Former Soviet Communist Party), Sel. and Intr. by Vyacheslav Sereda and Aleksandr Stikalin, Budapest, M6ra, 1993. In English, see Janos M. Rainer: 1956-The OtherSide of the Story. Five Documents from the YeltsinFile. The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 129, Spring 1993, pp.100-114. and Janos M. Rainer: TheYeltsin Dossier: Soviet Documents on Hungary, 1956," in: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Spring 1995. In Russian: Vengriya, aprel’-oktyabr’ 1956 goda, Vengriya, oktyabr’ - noyabr’ 1956 goda, Vengriya, noyabr’ 1956 - avgust 1957 g., Istoricheskii arkhiv, Nos. 4, 5, 6 (1993) 103-142, 132-160, 131-144, respectively.

(2) In Hungarian: Dontes a Kremlben, 1956. A szovjet partelnokseg vitai Magyarorszagrol (Decision in the Kremlin, 1956. The Debates of the Soviet Party Presidium on Hungary), ed. by Vyacheslav Sereda, Janos M.Rainer, Budapest, 1956-os Intezet,1996. In Russian: Kak reshalis’ voprosi Vengrii. Istoricheskii arkhiv, Nos. 2, 3 (1996), 73-104, 87-121, respectively. In English: The Malin Notes on the Crises in Hungary and Poland. Transl. and annot. by Mark Kramer. CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997) 385-410. In the following quotes are from this publication, see Malin Notes...

(3) See Csaba Bekes, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics, CWIHP Working Papers, No. 16. (1996); Tibor Hajdu: Szovjet diplomacia Magyarorszagon Sztalin halala elõtt es utan (Soviet Diplomacy Before and After the Death of Stalin). In: Magyarorszag es a nagyhatalmak a 20. szazadban. Tanulmanyok (Hungary and the Great Powers in the 20th Century). Ed. and Intr. by Ignac Romsics, Budapest, Teleki Laszlo Alapitvany, 1995, pp. 195-201; also 1956 nemzetkozi hattere (The Intemational Background of 1956),Tarsadalmi Szemle, Nos 8-9, 1989, and 1956 - Magyarorszag a szuperhatalmak jatekteren ( 1956 -Hungary in the Playing Field of the Superpowers), Valosag, No.12, 1990, from the same author.

(4) On October in Poland, see Janos Tischler: A lengyel partvezetes es az 1956-os magyar forradalom (The Polish Party Leadership and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution), in: Evkonyv, Vol. III, 1994, Budapest, 1956-os Intezet, pp. 180-181; Leo Gluchowski: Poland 1956. Khrushchev, Gomulka and the „Polish October”, in: CWHIP Bulletin, Spring 1995, pp. 38-49, Mark Kramer: New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises. CWHIP Bulletin, Issue 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), 358-384.

(5)Note on the October 20, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit. 388.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

(8)Note on the October 21, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 388.

(9) For Khruschev's report see Mark Kramer: Khrushchev's Report on CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956, CWIHP Bulletin, Spring 1995, pp. 50-56.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Note on the October 23, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit. 388-389.

(13) E. I. Malashenko: Osoby korpus v ognie Budapesta (Task Force In the Fire of Budapest), Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 10, 1993. -- Despite Soviet advice, by the dawn of October 24, Imre Nagy was Prime Minister.

(14) Mark Kramer: Khrushchev's Report on CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956, CWIHP Bulletin, Spring 1995, pp. 50-56.

(15) Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov arrived Budapest on 24 October, in the morning.

(16) Notes on the October 24 and 26 meetings of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit. 389, Dontes a Kremlben, op. cit. 30-33. pp.

(17)Note on the October 28, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit. 390.

(18) Ibid. 390.

(19) See the reports of Mikoyan and Suslov to CPSU CC Presidium, 26 October 1956, in: Hianyzo lapok, op. cit. 106-113.

(20)Note on the October 28, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit. 390.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid. 391.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Ibid.

(25) The protocole of the HWP Politburo meeting from the morning, 28 October see in: 1956 oktobere es a hatalom. Szerk. Horvath Julianna, Ripp Zoltan. Bp. Napvilag, 1997.

(26) A reference to the initiation of negotiations on the withdrawal of troops at some future stage had cropped up in Imre Nagy's radio broadcast of October 25. Nagy did not coordinate with the Soviets in advance that move, although he explained it the next day, bringing up the widespread demands as a reason. For Imre Nagy's speech, see: A forradalom hangja. Magyarorszagi radioadasok 1956. oktober 23-november 9. Budapest, Szazadveg - Nyilvanossag Klub, 1989. 72. For Mikoyan and Suslov's Oct. 25 report on it see A Jelcin-dosszie, op. cit., p. 51. Mikoyan also took part in the October 28 morning session of the PC, where he made no objection to the part of the resolution proposal (made by Janos Kadar, not Imre Nagy) that the "Nagy Formula" should. be adopted into the October 28 declaration.

(27)Note on the October 28, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit. 391-392.

(28) Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Eastern Europe, Vol. XXV (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990. 336. On the American attitude, see Csaba Bekes, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics, op. cit. 15-17.

(29) FRUS Vol XXV, op. cit. 338.

(30) Note on the October 30, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 392-393. Mikoyan and Suslov's October 30 report see Hianyzo lapok, op.cit., 125-126.

(31)Note on the October 30, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit. 392.

(32) Ibid.

(33) Ibid.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Ibid.

(38) Ibid.

(39) The statement was published in the October 31, 1956 issue of Pravda, and was also carried by the Hungarian papers on the same day.

(40)Note on the October 30, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit. 392.

(41)Ibid. 393.

(42)Pravda, Oct. 31, 1956.

(43)Note on the October 30, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 393.

(44)Note on the October 31, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 393.

(45)Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva, Voprosy Istorii, No. 4. (1995). Khrushchev also mentioned the sleepless nights on 3 November, while negotiating with Kadar, see Imre Horvath’s Notes of Khrushchev’s Speech at the November 3 Session, Malin Notes, op. cit. 398.

(46)Note on the October 31, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 393.

(47)Ibid.

(48)Ibid.

(49)Ibid.

(50)Ibid.

(51)Ibid.

(52)Khrushchev Remembers. The Glasnost Tapes. Little, Brown and Co. 1990. 122-123.

(53)Note on the November 1, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 394.

(54)Ibid.

(55)Note on the November 2, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 395-397.

(56)Ibid. 396.

(57)Ibid.

(58)Dontes a Kremlben, op. cit. 81. (This sentence is omitted from Kramer’s translation for unclear reasons.)

(59)Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva, Voprosy Istorii, No. 4. (1995).

(60)Note on the November 3, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 397-398, Imre Horvath’s Notes of Khrushchev’s Speech at the November 3 Session, Malin Notes, op. cit. 398.

(61)Imre Horvath’s Notes on November 3, 1956 Session of CPSU CC Presidium, Dontes a Kremlben op. cit. 94.

(62)Note on the November 3, 1956 Meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU CC, Malin Notes, op. cit., 397.

(63)Ibid.

(64)Ibid.

(65)Ibid. 398.

(66)Ibid.

(67)Notes of a Secure Phone Call from USSR Ambassador in Romania, A. A. Epishev, Malin Notes, op. cit. 397.